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HOLLINGSWORTH V. PERRY: WHAT SHOULD THE 
COURT DO? 
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY† 
Justice Anthony Kennedy faces a simple choice with profound 
consequences: When the Supreme Court considers the issue of marriage equality 
for gays and lesbians, does he want to write the next Plessy v. Ferguson1 or the 
next Brown v. Board of Education?2 
As Justice Kennedy approaches the issue, he likely knows it is just a matter 
of time before gays and lesbians are accorded marriage equality in this country. 
Since the year 2000, eleven countries have begun allowing same-sex couples to 
marry: The Netherlands, Belgium, Spain, Canada, South Africa, Norway, 
Sweden, Portugal, Iceland, Argentina, and Denmark.3 Last year, three more state 
legislatures, in Maine, Maryland, and Washington, adopted legislation allowing 
gays and lesbians to marry.4 Recent opinion polls show that half of Americans 
now favor allowing gay marriage;5 a 2011 poll found that 70% of Americans 
between the ages 18 and 34 support gay marriage.6 
In light of this, Justice Kennedy has to know that a Supreme Court opinion 
rejecting marriage equality will be considered in hindsight to be as misguided as 
the infamous Bowers v. Hardwick ruling, which held that states could 
criminalize private, adult, consensual homosexual activity.7 Justice Kennedy 
wrote the opinion in Lawrence v. Texas,8 overruling Bowers. In fact, Lawrence 
v. Texas was one of only two Supreme Court decisions in history advancing 
rights for gays and lesbians—the other was Romer v. Evans in 1996—and Justice 
 
 †  Dean and Distinguished Professor of Law, University of California, Irvine School of Law. 
1. 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (upholding separate but equal as constitutional). 
2. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding that separate can never be equal in public education). 
3. The Freedom to Marry Internationally, FREEDOM TO MARRY, http://www.freedomto 
marry.org/landscape/entry/c/international (last updated Dec. 2012). 
4. States, FREEDOM TO MARRY, http://www.freedomtomarry.org/states (last updated Nov. 8, 
2012). 
5. Behind Gay Marriage Momentum, Regional Gaps Persist, PEW RES. CENTER FOR THE 
PEOPLE & THE PRESS (Nov. 9, 2012), http://www.people-press.org/2012/11/09/behind-gay-
marriage-momentum-regional-gaps-persist/; Frank Newport, Half of Americans Support Legal Gay 
Marriage, GALLUP (May 8, 2012), http://www.gallup.com/poll/154529/Half-Americans-Support-
Legal-Gay-Marriage.aspx. 
6. Frank Newport, For First Time, Majority of Americans Favor Legal Gay Marriage, 
GALLUP (May 20, 2011), http://www.gallup.com/poll/147662/first-time-majority-americans-favor-
legal-gay-marriage.aspx. 
7. 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (upholding Georgia law prohibiting anal-genital or oral-genital 
contacts). 
8. 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (reversing Bowers and finding a constitutional right to engage in 
private consensual same-sex sexual activity). 
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Kennedy authored the majority opinions in both.9 
The Supreme Court has granted review in two cases concerning marriage 
equality to be decided in 2013. In United States v. Windsor, the Court will decide 
the constitutionality of Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act, which states 
that marriage must be between a man and a woman for the purposes of federal 
law.10 In Hollingsworth v. Perry, the Court will decide the constitutionality of 
California’s Proposition 8, which amended the California Constitution to provide 
that marriage has to be between a man and a woman.11 Proposition 8 overturned 
a California Supreme Court decision interpreting the California Constitution to 
include a right to marriage equality for gays and lesbians.12 In each case, there 
are jurisdictional questions: whether House Republicans can defend the Defense 
of Marriage Act in light of the Obama administration’s refusal to do so, and 
whether supporters of an initiative may defend it on appeal when the Governor 
and Attorney General refuse to do so. 
In Perry, the Supreme Court has the opportunity to decide the 
constitutionality of same-sex marriage.13 In doing so, Justice Kennedy and the 
Court can choose between two possible approaches in invalidating Proposition 
8.14 
I.  
RULE NARROWLY AND INVALIDATE ONLY CALIFORNIA’S PROPOSITION 8 
One approach for Justice Kennedy would be to rule narrowly in 
Hollingsworth v. Perry, as the Ninth Circuit did in Perry v. Brown, and simply 
strike down California’s Proposition 8.15 This approach has the virtue of 
 
9. Id.; Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (invalidating a Colorado initiative repealing all 
laws in the state protecting gays and lesbians from discrimination and prohibiting the enactment of 
any new such statutes). 
10. United States v. Windsor, 699 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 81 U.S.L.W. 
3116 (U.S. Dec. 7, 2012) (No. 12-307) (citing Defense of Marriage Act, 1 U.S.C. § 7 (1996)).  
11. 81 U.S.L.W. 3075 (U.S. Dec. 7, 2012) (No. 12-144), granting cert. to Perry v. Brown, 
671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012), aff'g Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 
2010); Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d at 1067 (citing CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, OFFICIAL VOTER 
INFORMATION GUIDE 54 (2008), available at http://vig.cdn.sos.ca.gov/2008/general/title-
sum/pdf/prop8-title-summary.pdf). 
12. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d at 1063. 
13. I focus primarily on Perry in this Comment, rather than Windsor, because I am 
contributing to a larger dialogue that began in the Symposium sponsored by the N.Y.U. Review of 
Law & Social Change, “Making Constitutional Change: The Past, Present, and Future Role of 
Perry v. Brown.” This Comment expands upon the points I made regarding Perry as a Symposium 
panelist.  
14. There is a third approach available that would have the effect of invalidating Proposition 
8: the Court could say that supporters of Proposition 8 lack standing to appeal Judge Walker’s 
ruling striking down the initiative. This would leave Judge Walker’s state-wide injunction in place. 
I do not focus on this alternative in this essay, choosing instead to examine how the Supreme Court 
should write an opinion striking down Proposition 8 on the merits. 
15. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d at 1080–82 (9th Cir. 2012). 
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invalidating only the California initiative without affecting other states that have 
always prohibited same-sex marriage. It may appeal to Justice Kennedy as a way 
of proceeding one step at a time. 
This approach is also founded on sound constitutional grounds. Prior to the 
enactment of Proposition 8 in November 2008, California allowed both opposite-
sex and same-sex couples to marry.16 Proposition 8 took this right away from 
gays and lesbians only.17 In its 2-1 decision in Perry v. Brown, the Ninth Circuit 
concluded that there is simply no legitimate reason for depriving only gays and 
lesbians of the right to marry.18 The court relied heavily on the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Romer v. Evans, which declared unconstitutional a Colorado 
initiative that repealed laws protecting gays and lesbians from discrimination.19 
Yet there is something unsatisfying about the Supreme Court taking this 
approach. Just as there is no legitimate reason for California to take away the 
right to marry only from gays and lesbians, there is no legitimate reason for other 
states to deny them this right. In Lawrence v. Texas and Romer v. Evans, Justice 
Kennedy, writing for the Court, found laws burdening gays and lesbians 
unconstitutional because they lacked any legitimate government purpose.20 The 
same is true for all laws prohibiting marriage equality for gays and lesbians. 
Also, the Ninth Circuit’s approach brings to light a difficult underlying issue: if a 
state recognizes a right that is not required by the Constitution, when may it 
repeal that right? 
II.  
RULE BROADLY AND INVALIDATE ALL BANS ON MARRIAGE EQUALITY AS 
VIOLATIONS OF EQUAL PROTECTION 
This leads to the second approach, the one I believe Kennedy and the Court 
should take: follow the lead of Judge Vaughn Walker in the Northern District of 
California and declare that laws denying marriage equality to gays and lesbians 
violate equal protection.21 Justice Kennedy can write an opinion in Perry that is 
very similar to those he authored in Romer and Lawrence, stating that there is no 
legitimate government interest in denying marriage equality to gays and lesbians. 
Justice Kennedy can go through each justification offered for denying 
 
16. Id. at 1076. 
17. Id. 
18. Id. at 1095 (“Proposition 8 operates with no apparent purpose but to impose on gays and 
lesbians, through the public law, a majority’s private disapproval of them and their relationships . . 
. . Proposition 8 therefore violates the Equal Protection Clause.”).  
19. Id. at 1080–82 (citing Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 627 (1996)) (comparing Proposition 
8 to the amendment at issue in Romer). 
20. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003); Romer, 517 U.S. at 621. 
21. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 1003 (N.D. Cal. 2010), aff’d sub nom. 
Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012), granting cert. sub nom. to Hollingsworth v. Perry, 
81 U.S.L.W. 3075 (U.S. Dec. 7, 2012) (No. 12-144). 
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marriage equality and find that none is a legitimate government interest. For 
instance, one argument against same-sex marriage is that marriage is inherently 
between opposite-sex spouses. But that is a definition, not an argument. The fact 
that marriage has traditionally been between opposite-sex spouses doesn’t reveal 
anything about the characteristics of marriage and why those characteristics have 
to be limited to opposite-sex couples. Under this form of argument, laws that 
prohibited interracial marriage were also constitutional. The Virginia law that 
prohibited interracial marriage existed for almost three hundred years.22 If a long 
tradition of prohibiting particular types of marriage is sufficient, then the Court 
came to the wrong conclusion in Loving v. Virginia.23 
Certainly, the existence of a practice over a long period of time doesn’t tell 
us anything about whether that practice is legitimate or permissible. Admittedly, 
Loving used strict scrutiny, and it is uncertain whether the Supreme Court would 
do so in examining the ban on marriage equality for gays and lesbians, under 
either the Due Process or Equal Protection clauses.24 But if one thinks about all 
of the core characteristics of marriage—the expression of love and commitment, 
the benefits and responsibilities—none of these has anything to do with the 
sexual orientation of the individuals participating. 
A second argument that is likely to be advanced in the Court is that marriage 
is inherently about procreation.25 Same-sex marriage doesn’t make sense, it is 
argued, because same-sex couples can’t procreate without assistance.26 This 
argument is wrong on every possible level. Marriage, of course, is not inherently 
about procreation. Couples are allowed to get marriage licenses even if one or 
both of the spouses can’t or don’t want to procreate. Women past the age of 
menopause can get marriage licenses, as can men who have been sterilized or are 
infertile. A requirement of intent to procreate does not exist for heterosexual 
couples that want a marriage license, so there’s no sense imposing one on same-
sex couples. More importantly, same-sex couples do procreate, whether through 
artificial insemination, surrogacy, or adoption. Even if marriage were about 
procreation, there would be no legitimate reason to deny it to same-sex couples 
because they have children, too. 
A third argument is that children do better with opposite-sex parents than 
with same-sex parents, and thus the government is justified in denying marriage 
licenses for same-sex couples. President George W. Bush made this argument. 
He said the social science data shows that children do better if they have parents 
 
22. RACHEL F. MORAN, INTERRACIAL INTIMACY: THE REGULATION OF RACE AND ROMANCE 19 
(2001). 
23. 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (finding bans on interracial marriage unconstitutional). 
24. Id. at 11. 
25. This was the primary argument of the supporters of Proposition 8 in the Ninth Circuit. 
See Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d at 1086–87 (9th Cir. 2012). 
26. Id. 
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of opposite genders.27 
At the outset, it is important to note that studies do not actually support that 
proposition. The studies that George Bush pointed to show that children with 
single parents often have more problems than children with two parents.28 But 
that has nothing do to with sexual orientation. It does reflect that being a parent 
is enormously difficult. (As somebody who has always been fortunate enough to 
have a partner in parenting, I can only imagine how difficult it is to be a single 
parent of a child.) It doesn’t at all relate to the issue of whether or not same-sex 
couples should get marriage licenses. 
Most of all, the problem with this argument is that it truly misses the point. 
The question is not whether same-sex couples should have children or not. The 
reality is that same-sex couples are going to have children. The question 
becomes whether children of same-sex couples are better off if their parents are 
married. I know of no studies that compare children with same-sex parents who 
are married to children with same-sex parents who are unmarried. Same-sex 
marriage is so new, not only in the United States but around the world, that time 
is needed to do such studies. Yet everything that we understand about marriage 
and how it contributes to the stability of relationships indicates that children with 
same-sex parents are better off if their parents are married, because marriage is 
more likely to lead to stable relationships. 
In explaining this, Justice Kennedy can echo the words of Chief Judge 
Judith Kaye of the New York Court of Appeals, who declared: 
The State plainly has a legitimate interest in the welfare of 
children, but excluding same-sex couples from marriage in no 
way furthers this interest. In fact, it undermines it. Civil 
marriage provides tangible legal protections and economic 
benefits to married couples and their children, and tens of 
thousands of children are currently being raised by same-sex 
couples in New York. . . . The State’s interest in a stable society 
is rationally advanced when families are established and remain 
intact irrespective of the gender of the spouses.29 
A fourth argument that is often made against same-sex marriage is that it 
will harm the institution of marriage. I confess that I don’t understand this 
argument. No heterosexual couple’s marriage is adversely affected in the 
slightest by virtue of gays and lesbians also being able to marry. In fact, I cannot 
think of anything more affirming of the institution of marriage in my lifetime 
than the fight by gays and lesbians to be able to marry. 
Thus, I believe that Justice Kennedy and the Court should choose the second 
 
27. Benedict Carey, Experts Dispute Bush on Gay-Adoption Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2005, 
at A16. 
28. Id. 
29. Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 32 (N.Y. 2006) (Kaye, C.J., dissenting). 
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path: decide that laws prohibiting marriage equality for gays and lesbians violate 
equal protection because they lack a legitimate government purpose. 
For many years, Justice Kennedy taught constitutional law at McGeorge 
Law School in Sacramento.30 As he imagines professors teaching the law in this 
area, it is hard to think that he would want to be remembered as the author of a 
Plessy v. Ferguson31 or a Bowers v. Hardwick.32 My hope is that Justice 
Kennedy will realize that the Perry decision, together with his opinions in Romer 
v. Evans and Lawrence v. Texas, can define his legacy as the justice in American 
history who did the most to advance equality based on sexual orientation. The 
alternative—an opinion reversing the Ninth Circuit—is on the wrong side of 
history, and it would ultimately be regarded as seriously misguided. 
 
30. Anthony Kennedy, MCGEORGE SCH. OF L., http://www.mcgeorge.edu/ 
Anthony_Kennedy.htm (last visited Jan. 16, 2013).  
31. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
32. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
